We study the problem of finding large weakly stable matchings when preference lists are incomplete and contain onesided ties. Computing maximum weakly stable matchings is known to be NP-hard. We present a polynomial-time algorithm that achieves an improved approximation ratio of 1 + 1/e. Like a number of existing approximation algorithms for this problem, our algorithm is based on a proposal process in which numerical priorities are adjusted according to the solution of a linear program, and are used for tiebreaking purposes. Our main idea is to use an infinitesimally small step size for incrementing the priorities. Our analysis involves solving an infinite-dimensional factor-revealing linear program. We also show that the ratio 1 + 1/e is an upper bound for the integrality gap, which matches the known lower bound.
Introduction
The stable matching problem, introduced by Gale and Shapley [5] , involves two disjoint sets of agents, typically called men and women in the literature. Each agent has ordinal preferences over the agents of the opposite sex. The objective is to find a set of disjoint man-woman pairs, called a matching, such that no man and woman prefer each other to their partners. Matchings satisfying this property are said to be stable and can be computed efficiently using the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Stable matchings have applications such as centralized schemes for recruiting medical residents to hospitals [25] .
Ties and incomplete lists arise naturally in realworld problems. The preference list of an agent is said to contain a tie when the agent is indifferent between two or more agents of the opposite sex. The preference list of an agent is said to be incomplete when one or more agents of the opposite sex are unacceptable to the agent. For such variants, the notion of stability can be generalized to weak stability, strong stability, or super-stability [10] . In this paper, we focus on weak stability since weakly stable matchings, unlike strongly stable or super-stable matchings, always exist. A weakly stable matching can be obtained by breaking all of the ties arbitrarily and then invoking the GaleShapley algorithm. When either ties or incomplete lists are absent, all weakly stable matchings have the same size [6, 25] . However, when both ties and incomplete lists are present, weakly stable matchings can vary in size.
The problem of finding large weakly stable matchings with ties and incomplete lists has been intensively studied. Iwama et al. [12] were the first to prove that finding a maximum weakly stable matching with ties and incomplete lists is NP-hard. Results by Yanagisawa [28] imply that getting an approximation ratio of 33 29 − ε (≈ 1.1379) is NP-hard, and getting a ratio of 4 3 − ε (≈ 1.3333) is UG-hard. On the positive side, it is straightforward to see that any weakly stable matching is a 2-approximate solution [20] . Using a local search approach, Iwama et al. [13] gave an algorithm with an approximation ratio of 15 8 (= 1.875). Király [16] improved the approximation ratio to 5 3 (≈ 1.6667) by introducing the idea of promoting unmatched agents to higher priorities for tie-breaking. The current best approximation ratio for two-sided ties and incomplete lists is 3 2 (= 1.5), which is achieved by the polynomial-time algorithm of McDermid [21] , and the linear-time algorithms of Paluch [23] and Király [17] . This ratio coincides with a lower bound for the integrality gap of an associated linear programming (LP) formulation [14] , indicating a potential barrier to further improvements.
Ties often appear only on one side of the market, especially in settings where institutions need to evaluate a large number of candidates. For example, in the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme, residents have strict preferences, while the preferences of the hospitals may contain ties [11] . With one-sided ties and incomplete lists, the problem of finding a maximum weakly stable matching remains NP-hard [20] . Results by Halldórsson et al. [7] imply that getting an approximation ratio of 1 Our Techniques and Contributions. In this paper, we focus on the maximum stable matching problem with one-sided ties and incomplete lists. Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that achieves an improved approximation ratio of 1 + 1/e (≈ 1.3679).
Our algorithm is motivated by a proposal process similar to that of Iwama et al. [14] , and that of Dean and Jalasutram [3] , in which numerical priorities are adjusted according to the LP solution, and are used for tie-breaking purposes. However, instead of using their priority manipulation schemes, we introduce a method of priority incrementation based on an adjustable step size parameter. In § 3.1, we present the description of our process along with some key properties. Both the description and the properties are expressed in terms of the step size parameter. In § 3.2, we consider the limit of this process as the step size becomes infinitesimally small, and we present a polynomial-time algorithm that satisfies the key properties with the step size parameter set to zero.
We analyze the approximation ratio of our algorithm in § 4 by directly comparing the size of our output 1 In the proof of this claim [8, Theorem 19] , Huang et al. exhibit a family of instances with 2k men and 2k women such that the corresponding LP has a feasible fractional value of (3/2 − o(1))k. It is asserted that a certain weakly stable matching of size k is a maximum weakly stable matching, but this assertion is incorrect. For the case when k = 2, there exists a weakly stable matching of size 3. Similarly, when k > 2, it can be shown that the maximum size of weakly stable matching is greater than k.
There is also a flaw related to the main result of their paper, which asserts an approximation ratio of 5 4 for the special case where ties are one-sided and are restricted to the end of the preference lists. In the derivation of inequalities (11) and (12) in their proof [8, Lemma 16] , it is claimed that δm,w 1+νw ≤ δm,w. This claim depends on the unproven assumption that δm,w is non-negative. It is unclear whether this flaw can be fixed. Both flaws have been acknowledged by Huang et al. in a personal communication.
matching with the optimal value of the LP. Although this is a standard approach to analyze approximation algorithms, it has not been used in prior work on this problem. Prior non-LP-based analyses [2, 9, 16, 24] are based on considering the symmetric difference of the output matching and an unknown optimal matching, and counting augmenting paths of various lengths. Such symmetric difference arguments are also used in prior LP-based analyses [3, 14] , where the output matching is compared to both an unknown optimal matching and an optimal LP solution. Instead of focusing on the symmetric difference, we develop a charging scheme for the priority increments. This scheme is described in § 4.1. In § 4.2, the key ingredients underlying our analysis are derived by applying the stability constraint and the tiebreaking criterion to all of the tie-related charges. While none of the prior analyses directly implies an upper bound for the integrality gap, our approach enables us to obtain an upper bound of 1 + 1/e for the integrality gap, which matches the known lower bound [14] .
As part of our analysis, we formulate an infinitedimensional factor-revealing LP; this LP is presented in § 4.3. The finite-dimensional factor-revealing LP technique was introduced by Jain et al. [15] , and since then a number of variants have been proposed [4, 19, 22] . However, it is often difficult to obtain a nice closedform solution. For the maximum stable matching problem with one-sided ties and incomplete lists, Dean and Jalasutram [3] obtained an approximation ratio of 19 13 by enumerating the combinatorial structures of augmenting paths and resorting to a computer-assisted proof for solving a large factor-revealing LP. In contrast, our infinite-dimensional factor-revealing LP is derived from the tie-related charges. Even though our infinitedimensional factor-revealing LP appears to be more complex than the one studied by Archer and Blasiak [1] in relation to the minimum latency problem, we are able to obtain an analytical solution using numerical results as guidance. In § 4.3.1, we discuss informally how calculus and numerical methods suggest a nice closedform solution. In § 4.3.2, we provide a formal analytical proof using LP duality. The stable matching problem with one-sided ties and incomplete lists (smoti) involves a set I of men and a set J of women. We assume that the sets I and J are disjoint and do not contain the element 0, which we use to denote being unmatched. Each man i ∈ I has a preference relation ≥ i over the set J ∪ {0} that satisfies antisymmetry, transitivity, and totality. Each woman j ∈ J has a preference relation ≥ j over the set I ∪ {0} that satisfies transitivity and totality. We denote this smoti instance as (I, J, {≥ i } i∈I , {≥ j } j∈J ). Notice that the preference relations {≥ j } j∈J of the women are not required to be antisymmetric, while the preference relations {≥ i } i∈I of the men are required to be antisymmetric. So ties are allowed in the preferences of the women, but not in the preferences of the men. For every woman j ∈ J, we write > j and = j to denote the asymmetric part and the symmetric part of ≥ j , respectively. Similarly, for every man i ∈ I, we write > i to denote the asymmetric part of ≥ i .
For every man i ∈ I and woman j ∈ J, we say that man i is acceptable to woman j if i ≥ j 0. Similarly, for every man i ∈ I and woman j ∈ J, we say that woman j is acceptable to man i if j ≥ i 0. Notice that preference lists are allowed to be incomplete. In other words, there may exist i ∈ I and j ∈ J such that 0 > j i or 0 > i j.
A matching is a subset µ ⊆ I ×J such that for every (i, j), (i , j ) ∈ µ, we have i = i if and only if j = j . For every man i ∈ I, if (i, j) ∈ µ for some woman j ∈ J, we say that man i is matched to woman j in matching µ, and we write µ(i) = j. Otherwise, we say that man i is unmatched in matching µ, and we write µ(i) = 0. Similarly, for every woman j ∈ J, if (i, j) ∈ µ for some man i ∈ I, we say that woman j is matched to man i in matching µ, and we write µ(j) = i. Otherwise, we say that woman j is unmatched in matching µ, and we write µ(j) = 0.
A matching µ is individually rational if for every (i, j) ∈ µ, we have j ≥ i 0 and i ≥ j 0. An individually rational matching µ is weakly stable if for every man i ∈ I and woman j ∈ J, either µ(i) ≥ i j or µ(j) ≥ j i. Otherwise, (i, j) forms a strongly blocking pair.
The goal of the maximum stable matching problem with one-sided ties and incomplete lists (max-smoti) is to find a maximum-cardinality weakly stable matching for a given smoti instance.
The Linear Programming Formulation.
The following LP formulation is based on that of Rothblum [26] , which extends that of Vande Vate [27] .
3)
In Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, we present two straightforward properties of the LP formulation. Vande Vate [27] used constraint (2.6) in the statement of Lemma 2.2 below, together with constraint (2.5) and tight versions of constraints (2.1) and (2.2), to characterize stable matchings in the special case where all preference lists are complete and the number of men is equal to the number of women. Rothblum [26] extended the result of Vande Vate and used constraints (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), (2.4), and (2.5) to characterize stable matchings for the model with strict preferences and incomplete lists, and where the number of men is not necessarily equal to the number of women. This formulation was adapted to study maximum weakly stable matching with onesided ties and incomplete lists by Iwama et al. [14] , and by Dean and Jalasutram [3] . Our model also allows a woman to be indifferent between being unmatched and being matched with some of the men. Accordingly, we provide proofs of Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 for the sake of completeness. Proof. Suppose {x i,j } (i,j)∈I×J satisfies constraints (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), (2.4), and (2.5). Constraints (2.1), (2.2), and (2.5) imply that {x i,j } (i,j)∈I×J corresponds to a valid matching µ. Constraint (2.4) implies that µ is individually rational. To show the weak stability of µ, consider man i ∈ I and woman j ∈ J. It suffices to show that (i, j) is not a strongly blocking pair. We may assume that j > i 0 and i > j 0, for otherwise individual rationality implies
Consider constraint (2.3) associated with (i, j). At least one of the two summations is equal to 1. If the first summation is equal to 1, then µ(i) > i j. If the second summation is equal to 1, then µ(j) ≥ j i. Thus, µ is a weakly stable matching.
Conversely, suppose {x i,j } (i,j)∈I×J corresponds to a weakly stable matching µ. Since µ is a valid matching, constraints (2.1), (2.2), and (2.5) are satisfied. Also, the individual rationality of µ implies that constraint (2.4) is satisfied. To show that constraint (2.3) is satisfied, consider (i, j) ∈ I × J such that j > i 0 and i > j 0. It suffices to show that at least one of the two summations in constraint (2.3) associated with (i, j) is equal to 1. By the weak stability of µ, we have either µ(i) ≥ i j or µ(j) ≥ j i. We consider two cases. subsection, we describe a proposal process with priorities which is similar to that of Iwama et al. [14] , and that of Dean and Jalasutram [3] . Our algorithm is motivated by this process, and is presented in § 3.2.
Our proposal process with priorities takes an smoti instance and a step size parameter η > 0 as input, and produces a weakly stable matching µ as output. In the preprocessing phase, we compute an optimal fractional solution {x i,j } (i,j)∈I×J to the associated LP. We also define
for every man i ∈ I and woman j ∈ J ∪ {0}. Then, in the initialization phase, we assign the empty matching to µ and each man i is assigned a priority p i equal to 0. For each man i, we also maintain a set L i of women which is initialized to the empty set. We use the set L i to store the women to whom man i must propose before his priority p i is increased by η. After that, the process enters the proposal phase and proceeds iteratively.
In each iteration, we pick an unmatched man i with priority p i < 1 + η. If the set L i is empty, we increment his priority p i by η and then update L i to the set {j ∈ J : j ≥ i 0 and w(i, j) ≤ p i }. Otherwise, the man i that we pick has a non-empty set L i of women. Let j denote the most preferred woman of man i in L i . We remove j from L i and man i proposes to woman j. When woman j receives the proposal from man i, she tentatively accepts him if she is currently unmatched and he is acceptable to her. Otherwise, if woman j is currently matched to another man i , she tentatively accepts her preferred choice between men i and i , and rejects the other. In the event of a tie, she compares the current priorities p i and p i of the men and accepts the one with higher priority. (If the priorities of i and i are equal, she breaks the tie arbitrarily.) If man i is tentatively accepted by woman j, the matching µ is updated accordingly.
When every unmatched man i has priority p i ≥ 1 + η, the process terminates and outputs the final matching µ.
Our process is similar to that of Iwama et al. [14] , and that of Dean and Jalasutram [3] , which also use a proposal scheme with priorities. In particular, the way that we populate the set L i with a subset of women by referring to the LP solution is based on their methods. The major difference is that, in our process, priorities only increase by a small step size η, whereas in their algorithms, the priorities may increase by a possibly larger amount, essentially to ensure that a new woman is added to L i . As in their algorithms, for every woman j, the sequence of tentative partners µ(j) of woman j satisfies a natural monotonicity property. Woman j is initially unmatched, and becomes matched the first time she receives a proposal from a man who is acceptable to her. In each subsequent iteration, she either keeps her current partner or gets a weakly preferred partner. Furthermore, if she is indifferent between her new partner and her old partner, then the new partner has a weakly larger priority. When the process terminates, the following predicates hold, which are analogous to predicates satisfied by the algorithms of Iwama et al. [14] and Dean and Jalasutram [3] .
for every (i, j) ∈ µ, we have j ≥ i 0 and i ≥ j 0. P 2 (µ): for every man i ∈ I and woman j ∈ J such that j ≥ i µ(i) and i ≥ j 0, we have µ(j) = 0 and µ(j) ≥ j i.
P 4 (µ, p, η): for every man i ∈ I and woman j ∈ J such that j ≥ i 0, i ≥ j 0, and
To establish that P 1 (µ) holds, it is easy to see that man i proposes to woman j only if she is acceptable to him, and woman j accepts a proposal from man i only if he is acceptable to her. For P 2 (µ), if man i weakly prefers woman j to µ(i) and is acceptable to woman j, then man i has proposed to woman j. Thus the monotonicity property implies that µ(j) = 0 and µ(j) ≥ j i. For P 3 (µ, p, η), it is easy to see that the priority p i of man i lies within the specified range when he proposes to woman µ(i). For P 4 (µ, p, η), if man i and woman j satisfy the stated assumptions, then man i proposed to woman j when his priority was equal to p i − η, and this proposal was eventually rejected. Immediately after this proposal was rejected, woman j was matched with a man i such that i = i and i ≥ j i. The monotonicity property implies that µ(j) = 0 and µ(j) ≥ j i ≥ j i. Furthermore, if µ(j) = j i, then µ(j) = j i = j i. Since i = j i, the priority of man i was at least p i − η when the aforementioned proposal was rejected. Since µ(j) = j i , the monotonicity property implies that p µ(j) ≥ p i − η.
3.2 The Implementation. The proposal process with priorities of § 3.1 depends on a step size parameter η > 0. To obtain a good approximation ratio, we would like the step size parameter η to be small. However, the running time of a naive implementation grows in proportion to η −1 . We can imagine that if we take an infinitesimally small step size, then P 3 (µ, p, η) and P 4 (µ, p, η) can be satisfied with η = 0. Algorithm 1 is motivated by the idea of simulating the process of § 3.1 with an infinitesimally small step size. We maintain for every man i ∈ I a priority p i and a pointer i ∈ J ∪ {0} into the preference list of man i. For every man i ∈ I and woman j ∈ J, we think of man i as having proposed to woman j if and only if j > i i . Given = { i } i∈I and j ∈ J, we define
as the set of all men i who have proposed to woman j. Given = { i } i∈I , we define G( ) as the bipartite graph with vertex set I ∪ J and edge set
For any and any matching µ, we define a µ-alternating path in G( ) as a (possibly zero-length) simple path in G( ) that alternates between edges not in µ and edges in µ.
The following lemma is proven in Appendix A. This result is used in § 4 to establish that Algorithm 1 achieves a 1 + 1/e approximation guarantee.
Let us define the weight of any edge (i, j) in E( ) as w(i, i ). We use the abbreviations MCM and MWMCM to denote the terms maximum-cardinality matching and maximum-weight MCM, respectively. The following lemma is proven in Appendix B.
Lemma 3.2. An invariant of the Algorithm 1 loop is that µ is an MWMCM of G( ).
Lemma 3.2 leads us to consider Algorithm 2, which has a more succinct description than Algorithm 1, and does not maintain a priority vector p. In Appendix B, we use our analysis of Algorithm 1 to prove Lemma 3.3 below. This result is used in § 4 to establish that Algorithm 2 also achieves an approximation ratio of 1 + 1/e. Lemma 3.3. When Algorithm 2 terminates, P 1 (µ) and P 2 (µ) hold. Furthermore, there exist priorities {p i } i∈I such that P 3 (µ, p, 0) and P 4 (µ, p, 0) hold. Proof. Letting µ denote the output matching produced by Algorithm 1 (resp., Algorithm 2), Lemma 3.1 (resp., Lemma 3. 3) implies that P 1 (µ) and P 2 (µ) hold. Since P 1 (µ) holds, µ is individually rational. To establish weak stability of µ, consider (i, j) ∈ I × J. It suffices to show that (i, j) is not a strongly blocking pair. For the sake of contradiction, suppose j > i µ(i) and i > j µ(j). If 0 > j i, then 0 > j i > j µ(j), contradicting the individual rationality of µ. If i ≥ j 0, then since j > i µ(i), i ≥ j 0, and P 2 (µ) holds, we deduce that µ(j) ≥ j i, contradicting the assumption that i > j µ(j).
Algorithms 1 and 2 run in polynomial time since linear programming is polynomial-time solvable, the number of iterations of the loop is at most |I| × |J|, and each iteration can be performed in polynomial time.
(Using alternating breadth-first search from i 1 , each iteration of Algorithm 1 can be performed in time linear in the size of G( ).)
Algorithm 1
1: compute an optimal fractional solution {x i,j } (i,j)∈I×J to the associated LP 2: let {w(i, j)} (i,j)∈I×(J∪{0}) be defined by (3.7) 3: initialize µ to the empty matching 4: for every man i ∈ I, initialize i to the most preferred woman j ∈ J ∪ {0} with respect to ≥ i 5: for every man i ∈ I, initialize p i to w(i, i ) 6: while there exists a man i ∈ I such that µ(i) = 0 and i > i 0 do 7: let i 0 be such a man, and let j 0 denote the woman i0
8:
update i0 to the most preferred woman j ∈ {j ∈ J : j 0 > i0 j } ∪ {0} with respect to ≥ i0
9:
if µ(j 0 ) = 0 and i 0 ≥ j0 0 then 10:
else 12:
let I 0 denote {i ∈ I : i is reachable from i 1 via a µ 0 -alternating path in G( )}
15:
let i 2 be a man in arg min i∈I0 w(i, i )
16:
let π 0 be a µ 0 -alternating path from i 1 to i 2 in G( )
17:
update p i to max(p i , w(i 2 , i2 )) for each man i in I 0
18
:
end if 20: end while 21: return matching µ
Algorithm 2
1: compute an optimal fractional solution {x i,j } (i,j)∈I×J to the associated LP 2: let {w(i, j)} (i,j)∈I×(J∪{0}) be defined by (3.7) 3: initialize µ to the empty matching 4: for every man i ∈ I, initialize i to the most preferred woman j ∈ J ∪ {0} with respect to ≥ i 5: while there exists a man i ∈ I such that µ(i) = 0 and i > i 0 do 6: let i 0 be such a man, and let j 0 denote the woman i0
7:
update i0 to the most preferred woman j ∈ {j ∈ J : j 0 > i0 j } ∪ {0} with respect to ≥ i0 8: update µ to an arbitrary MWMCM of G( ) 9: end while 10: return matching µ
Analysis of the Approximation Ratio
In this section, we analyze the approximation ratio and the integrality gap. Our analysis applies to both Algorithms 1 and 2. Throughout this section, whenever we mention {x i,j } (i,j)∈I×J , {w(i, j)} (i,j)∈I×(J∪{0}) , and µ, we are referring to their values when the algorithm terminates. By Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3, conditions P 1 (µ), P 2 (µ), P 3 (µ, p, 0), and P 4 (µ, p, 0) hold for some p = {p i } i∈I . We fix such priority values p throughout this section. We also denote
as the set of matched men and
as the set of matched women in the output matching µ.
Auxiliary
Charges. Define the auxiliary charge
for every man i ∈ I and woman j ∈ J. So, for every man i ∈ I, the auxiliary charges { x i,j } j∈J correspond to the following charging process: Go through the list of all women j, from most preferred to least preferred under preference relation ≥ i , and charge an amount of at most x i,j until a total charge of p i is reached, or the list of women is exhausted. The quantities { x i,j } j∈J correspond to the charged amounts. In Lemma 4.1, we present some simple properties of the auxiliary charges. In Lemma 4.2, we present some simple necessary conditions for an auxiliary charge to be positive.
Lemma 4.1. Let i ∈ I be a man. Then the following properties hold.
(1) For all women j, j ∈ J such that x i,j > 0 and j > i j, we have
j∈J
Proof.
(1) Let women j, j ∈ J satisfy x i,j > 0 and j > i j.
where the equalities follow from the definitions of w(i, j) and w(i, j ).
(2) Let J i = {j ∈ J : x i,j > 0}. It suffices to show that
For the sake of contradiction, suppose (4.8)
Since p i ≥ 0, inequality (4.8) implies J i is nonempty. Let j ∈ J i be the least preferred woman in J i under the preference relation ≥ i . Then
where the second equality follows from part (1), and the third equality follows from the definition of w(i, j ). Combining (4.8) and (4.9) gives x i,j > p i − w(i, j ). Also x i,j > 0 since j ∈ J i . Hence
For the sake of contradiction, suppose (4.10)
P 3 (µ, p, 0) implies p i ≤ 1, and so inequality (4.10) implies that J i is non-empty. Let j ∈ J i be the most preferred woman in J i under the preference relation ≥ i . Then
Also, by constraint (2.1), we have
where the second equality follows from the definition of w(i, j ). By combining (4.10), (4.11), and (4.12), we obtain For every man i ∈ I * , we define the auxiliary quantity
For every woman j ∈ J * , we define the auxiliary quantities
We also denote
as the Heaviside step function.
Intuitively, for every man i ∈ I and woman j ∈ J, we think of the auxiliary charge x i,j as tie-related if woman j is indifferent between i and µ(j). Then the quantity q i corresponds to the total tie-related charge associated with man i and all matched women. Similarly, the quantity y j corresponds to the total tie-related charge associated with woman j and all unmatched men. Finally, the quantity z j corresponds to the right hand side of constraint (2.6) for (i, j) = (µ(j), j).
For every man i ∈ I and woman j ∈ J, it is easy to see that 0 ≤ x i,j ≤ x i,j . Hence it follows from constraints (2.1) and (2.2) that q i , y i , z i ∈ [0, 1] for every man i ∈ I * . In Lemma 4.3, we present some simple properties of the auxiliary quantities. In Lemma 4.4, we show that the difference between the size of the matching produced by the algorithm and the optimal fractional value of the LP is bounded by an expression involving the auxiliary quantities. Proof. Let j = µ(i). By the definition of y i , we have
where the third equality follows from Lemma 4.2. By the definition of q i , we have
where the second inequality follows from part (2) of Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.4.
i∈I j∈J
Proof. Consider (4.13) i∈I j∈J
Part (3) of Lemma 4.1 implies i∈I j∈J
where the second inequality follows from P 3 (µ, p, 0), and the second equality follows from the definitions of {w(i, 0)} i∈I\I * . Lemma 4.2 implies i∈I j∈J
where the last equality follows from the definitions of {q i } i∈I * . The definitions of {z i } i∈I * imply
where the inequality follows from the definitions of { x i,j } (i,j)∈I×J . The definitions of {y i } i∈I * imply i∈I *
Combining (4.13), (4.14), (4.15), (4.16), and (4.17) gives the desired inequality.
The Stability
Constraint and the TieBreaking Criterion. In this subsection, we develop the key ingredients underlying our analysis by making careful use of the stability constraint for matched women and the tie-breaking criterion for matched men. The stability constraint, which says that no matched woman can participate in a strongly blocking pair, corresponds to Lemma 2.2. The tie-breaking criterion corresponds to predicate P 4 (µ, p, 0).
In Lemma 4.5, we consider the stability constraint associated with a matched pair (i, j) ∈ µ and show that z i is at most p i .
Lemma 4.5. Let i ∈ I
* be a man. Then z i ≤ p i .
Proof. Let j = µ(i). Since P 1 (µ) holds, we have j ≥ i 0 and i ≥ j 0. By the definition of z i , we have
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 2.2, the third equality follows from the definition of w(i, j), and the second inequality follows from P 3 (µ, p, 0).
In Lemma 4.6, we consider pairs (i, j) ∈ I * × J * where the associated auxiliary charge x i,j is positive and woman j is indifferent between man i and the man µ(j) to whom she is matched. These are the pairs that contribute to the tie-related charges {q i } i∈I * . By applying the tie-breaking criterion and the stability constraint to these pairs (i, j), we establish two useful inequalities.
Lemma 4.6. Let i ∈ I * be a man and j ∈ J * be a woman such that x i,j > 0 and µ(j) = j i. Then
and
Proof. Since x i,j > 0, the definition of x i,j implies x i,j > 0 and p i > w(i, j). Since x i,j > 0, constraint (2.4) implies j ≥ i 0 and i ≥ j 0. Thus P 4 (µ, p, 0) implies
which establishes the first desired inequality. Since x i,j > 0, parts (2) and (1) of Lemma 4.1 imply
By the definition of z j , we have
where the second equality follows from µ(j) = j i, and the inequality follows from Lemma 2. 
Lemma 4.7. If I
* is non-empty, then for every f ∈ F,
Lemma 4.8. Let i ∈ I
* be a man and f ∈ F. Let
Proof. We may assume that
where the second equality follows from the definition of q i . So, it suffices to show that
For the sake of contradiction, suppose
Since f ∈ F, we have
So the set J i is non-empty. Let j ∈ J i be the most preferred woman in J i under the preference relation ≥ i . Then
Lemma 4.9. Let i ∈ I * be a man and f ∈ F. Let J * i be the set defined by (4.21). Then, for every woman j ∈ J * i such that
Proof. Let j ∈ J * i be a woman such that x i,j > 0. Since j ∈ J * i , we have j ∈ J * and µ(j) = j i. Since x i,j > 0 and µ(j) = j i, Lemma 4.6 implies
and (4.23)
Since f ∈ F, inequality (4.22) implies
where the second inequality follows from j ∈ J * i , and the third inequality follows from (4.23).
Lemma 4.10. Let j ∈ J * be a woman. Then
Proof. By constraint (2.2), we have
where the third inequality follows from the definitions of { x i,j } i∈I , and the equality follows from the definitions of z j and y j .
Proof of Lemma 4.7 . Suppose I * is non-empty. Let f ∈ F. For every man i ∈ I * , let J * i be the set defined by (4.21). Then Lemma 4.8 implies
where the first equality follows from Lemma 4.9, the second inequality follows from the definition of J * i , the third inequality follows from Lemma 4.10, and the last equality follows from the change of variables i = µ(j).
4.3 Factor-Revealing Optimization. In order to obtain the approximation ratio, we use Lemmas 4.3, 4.5, and 4.7 to derive a bound for the right-hand side of Lemma 4.4 . We can formulate this as the following factor-revealing optimization problem over
The above factor-revealing optimization problem is nonconvex in {p i , q i , y i , z i } i∈I * . Moreover, the formulation depends on the size of I * . To overcome these issues, we reformulate it as the following infinite-dimensional factor-revealing LP over random variables P, Q, Y, Z ∈ [0, 1].
and max(Q, Z)
Notice that the above infinite-dimensional factorrevealing LP is linear in the joint distribution of (P, Q, Y, Z).
An Informal Investigation.
We first present an informal investigation of the infinite-dimensional factor-revealing LP. A formal analytical solution is presented in § 4.3.2.
One approach to the infinite-dimensional factorrevealing LP is to obtaining a numerical solution via a suitable discretization. More precisely, we can bucket the support of (P, Q, Y, Z) into disjoint hypercubes, and assign to each such hypercube a variable that corresponds to the probability mass inside the hypercube. We can also restrict our attention to a finite subfamily of F. This discretizes the infinite-dimensional factorrevealing LP into a finite LP which can be solved numerically. However, none of the numerical optimal solutions of the finite LP can equal 1/e, which is irrational.
Our numerical results suggest that an optimal solution occurs when P = Q = p 0 ≈ 0.6 and Y = 0. Suppose P = Q = p 0 and Y = 0. Then it is easy to see that constraint (4.25) depends only on u = f (p 0 ). So the infinite-dimensional factor-revealing LP becomes
the dual of which is
Suppose the constraints in the dual are tight for all z ∈ (0, p 0 ). Differentiating twice with respect to z gives
This ordinary differential equation has the solution ρ U (u) ∝ (1 − p 0 + u) −2 . Furthermore, assuming that the constraints in the dual are tight for all z ∈ [0, p 0 ], we get ρ U (u) = (1 − p 0 )(1 − p 0 + u) −2 and λ = p 0 , with an objective value of (p 0 − 1) ln(1 − p 0 ). In fact, if p 0 ≤ 1 − 1/e, this objective value is attained by the primal solution
where δ is the Dirac delta function. The maximum objective value of (p 0 − 1) ln(1 − p 0 ) is 1/e, which occurs when p 0 = 1 − 1/e.
A Formal Analytical Solution.
To obtain a formal analytical solution, we consider functions in F of the form f u (p) = (1 − p)u where u ∈ [0, ∞).
(In our earlier technical report [18] , we established an approximation ratio of ln 4 by considering constant functions.) Then constraint (4.25) implies
Lemma 4.11 below presents a simple inequality. Lemma 4.12 can be regarded as a dual feasibility result. The probability density function ρ U plays the role of the dual variables corresponding to constraint (4.26), while the dual variable λ corresponds to constraint (4.24). Lemma 4.13 uses Lemma 4.12 to bound the objective value of the infinite dimensional factor-revealing LP using Lemma 4.12. Our proof is analogous to that of the weak duality theorem for finite LP, in which any feasible primal solution is bounded by any feasible dual solution.
, we have dg(p) dp
Lemma 4.12. Let p, q, y, z ∈ [0, 1] such that (1−p)y = 0 and max(q, z) ≤ p. Let U be a continuous random variable with probability density function
Proof. Since 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, we consider two cases.
where the first inequality follows from q ≤ p and (1 − p)y = 0, and the second inequality follows from Lemma 4.11.
Lemma 4.13. Let P, Q, Y, Z ∈ [0, 1] be random variables satisfying constraints (4.24) and (4.25). Then
Proof. Pick U independent of (P, Q, Y, Z) according to the probability density function ρ U defined by (4.27).
Since constraint (4.24) is satisfied by (P, Q, Y, Z), Lemma 4.12 implies
Also since constraint (4.25) is satisfied by (P, Q, Y, Z), constraint (4.26) is satisfied by (P, Q, Y, Z). Hence
4.4 The Approximation Ratio. Lemma 4.14 below is obtained by putting together the results in the preceding subsections. Our main results are presented in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 and proved using Lemma 4.14.
Lemma 4.14.
Proof. We may assume that I * is non-empty, for otherwise Lemma 4.4 implies i∈I j∈J
, where i is a man picked uniformly at random from I * . Then Lemmas 4.3 and 4.5 imply that (P, Q, Y, Z) satisfies (4.24). Also, Lemma 4.7 implies that (P, Q, Y, Z) satisfies (4.25). Hence Lemma 4.13 implies
Thus Lemma 4.4 implies
Theorem 4.1. Algorithms 1 and 2 are polynomial-time (1 + e −1 )-approximation algorithms for max-smoti.
Proof. By Lemma 3.4, Algorithms 1 and 2 each run in polynomial time and produce a weakly stable matching µ. Let µ be a maximum weakly stable matching, and {x i,j } (i,j)∈I×J be the indicator variables of µ . Since µ is weakly stable, Lemma 2.1 implies that {x i,j } (i,j)∈I×J satisfies constraints (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), (2.4), and (2.5). Hence Lemma 4.14 implies
where the second inequality follows from the optimality of {x i,j } (i,j)∈I×J . Proof. By Lemmas 3.4 and 4.14, there exists a weakly stable matching µ such that
Let {x i,j } (i,j)∈I×J be the indicator variables of µ.
Since µ is weakly stable, Lemma 2.1 implies that {x i,j } (i,j)∈I×J is an integral solution satisfying constraints (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), (2.4), and (2.5). Since
the integrality gap is at most 1+e −1 . This upper bound matches the known lower bound for the integrality gap [14, § 5.1].
We remark that our analysis of the infinitedimensional factor-revealing LP in Lemma 4.13 is tight, since our upper bound for the integrality gap is tight. Similarly, our reformulation of the finite-dimensional factor-revealing optimization problem into the infinitedimensional factor-revealing LP is tight in the limit as |I * | tends to infinity.
A Proof of Lemma 3.1
The purpose of this section is to prove Lemma 3.1.
We begin by establishing additional properties of Algorithm 1. It is straightforward to prove that throughout any execution of Algorithm 1, the program variable µ corresponds to a matching in the sense defined in § 2.1. Likewise, where it is defined, the program variable µ 0 corresponds to a matching. Accordingly, throughout our analysis, we assume that µ and µ 0 are matchings. It is convenient to define the following predicates.
Q 2 ( , µ): µ is a matching of G( ) such that for every i ∈ I and j ∈ J, if i ∈ I j ( ) and i ≥ j 0, then µ(j) = 0.
Q 4 ( , µ, p): for every i ∈ I such that µ(i) = 0, we have
Q 5 ( , p): for every i ∈ I and j ∈ J such that j > i i , we have w(i, j) ≤ p i .
Q 6 ( , µ, p): for every i, i ∈ I and j ∈ J such that (i, j) ∈ E( ) and µ(i ) = j, we have p i ≤ p i .
In addition we, define Q( , µ, p) as the conjunction of predicates
, and Q 6 ( , µ, p).
Lemma A.1. Let , µ, and p be such that Q( , µ, p) holds. Then P 1 (µ), P 2 (µ), P 3 (µ, p, 0), and P 4 (µ, p, 0) hold.
Proof. We begin by proving that P 1 (µ) holds. Let (i, j) ∈ µ. Since Q 2 ( , µ) holds, µ is matching of G( ).
Since (i, j) ∈ µ and µ is a matching of G( ), we have (i, j) ∈ E( ). Since (i, j) ∈ E( ), we have i ∈ I j ( ) and i ≥ j 0. Since i ∈ I j ( ), we have j > i i . Since Q 1 ( ) holds, we have i ≥ i 0. Since j > i i and i ≥ i 0, we have j > i 0. We now prove that P 2 (µ) holds. holds. Let i ∈ I be a man and j ∈ J be a woman such that j ≥ i µ(i) and i ≥ j 0. We prove that i ∈ I j ( ) by considering two cases.
Case 1: µ(i) = 0. The loop termination condition implies 0 ≥ i i . Since j ∈ J and j ≥ i µ(i) = 0, we have j > i 0. Since j > i 0 ≥ i i , we have i ∈ I j ( ).
Case 2:
Having established that i ∈ I j ( ), we now complete the proof that P 2 (µ) holds. Since i ∈ I j ( ) and i ≥ j 0, condition Q 2 ( , µ) implies µ(j) = 0. Since (µ(j), j) ∈ E( ) and i ∈ I j ( ), the definition of E( ) implies µ(j) ≥ j i.
We now prove that P 3 (µ, p, 0) holds. Let i ∈ I be a man. We consider two cases. Since Q 2 ( , µ) holds, µ is a matching of G( ). Since µ(i) = j and µ is a matching of G( ), we have (i, j) ∈ E( ). Since (i, j) ∈ E( ), we have i ∈ I j ( ) and hence j > i i . Since j > i i and Q 5 ( , p) holds, we have w(i, j) ≤ p i . It remains to argue that p i ≤ 1. Since constraint (2.1) holds, we have w(i, i ) ≤ 1. Since w(i, i ) ≤ 1 and Q 3 ( , p) holds, we have p i ≤ 1.
It remains to prove that P 4 (µ, p, 0) holds. Let i ∈ I be a man and j ∈ J be a woman such that j ≥ i 0, i ≥ j 0, and p i > w(i, j). Since p i > w(i, j) and Q 3 ( , p) holds, we have j > i i and hence i ∈ I j ( ). Since i ∈ I j ( ), i ≥ j 0, and Q 2 ( , µ) holds, we know that µ is a matching of G( ) with µ(j) = 0. Let i ∈ I denote µ(j). Since µ is a matching of G( ) and (i , j) belongs to µ, we have (i , j) ∈ E( ). Since (i , j) ∈ E( ) and i ∈ I j ( ), the definition of E( ) implies that i ≥ j i. It remains to prove that if i = j i then p i ≤ p i . Assume i = j i. Since (i , j) ∈ E( ), i ∈ I j ( ), and i = j i, the definition of E( ) implies that (i, j) ∈ E( ). Since (i, j) ∈ E( ), µ(i ) = j, and Q 6 ( , µ, p) holds, we have p i ≤ p i .
The following lemma is proven in § A.1. Proof. The only line in the loop body that modifies is line 8, which updates i0 . The definition of i 0 implies that
The following lemma characterizes how E( ) changes in a single iteration of the loop of Algorithm 1. We omit the proof, which is straightforward but tedious. 
Proof. Since Q 2 ( − , µ − ) holds, we know that µ − is a matching of G( − ). Let i ∈ I and j ∈ J be such that i ∈ I j ( + ) and i ≥ j 0. Case 1: µ − (j 0 ) = 0 and i 0 ≥ j0 0. Then µ
}, we find that µ + is a matching of G( + ). To establish that Q 2 ( + , µ 0 ) holds, it remains to prove that µ + (j) = 0. Case 1.1: j = j 0 . Then I j ( + ) = I j ( − ), and hence i ∈ I j ( − ). Since i ∈ I j ( − ), i ≥ j 0, and
+ is a matching of G( + ), and j = j 0 , we deduce that µ + (j) = i 0 = 0.
Case 2: µ − (j 0 ) = 0 or 0 > j0 i 0 . We need to prove that Q 2 ( + , µ 0 ) and Q 2 ( + , µ + ) hold. We begin by establishing two useful claims.
The first claim is that µ 0 is a matching of G( + ) that matches the same set of women as µ − . To prove this claim, we consider three cases.
, and µ − is a matching of G( − ), the claim follows.
− is a matching of G( − ), the claim follows.
and µ
The second claim is that µ + is a matching of G( + ) that matches the same set of women as µ 0 . Since µ 0 is a matching of G( + ) and µ + is the symmetric difference between µ 0 and an oriented µ 0 -alternating path in G( + ) from i 1 to i 2 , the second claim follows. Given the two preceding claims, we can establish that Q 2 ( + , µ 0 ) and Q 2 ( + , µ + ) hold by proving that µ − (j) = 0. If j = j 0 , the latter inequality follows from the Case 2 condition. Now suppose that j = j 0 . Then I j ( + ) = I j ( − ), and hence i ∈ I j ( − ). Since i ∈ I j ( − ), i ≥ j 0, and
Proof. Let i ∈ I. We consider two cases. Case 1: Proof.
(1) Let i, i ∈ I and j ∈ J be such that (i, j) ∈ E( + ) and µ 0 (i ) = j. We need to prove that p man i on path π 0 . Since Q 3 ( − , p − ) holds, we have p (2) Proof. If µ − (j 0 ) = 0 or 0 > j0 i 0 , then part (4) of Lemma A.9 implies that Q 6 ( + , µ + , p + ) holds. For the remainder of the proof, assume that µ − (j 0 ) = 0 and i 0 ≥ j0 0. Thus µ + = µ − ∪ {(i 0 , j 0 )}, p + = p − , and part (3) of Lemma A.4 implies E( + ) = E( − ) ∪ {(i 0 , j 0 )}.
Let i, i ∈ I and j ∈ J be such that (i, j) ∈ E( + ) and µ + (i ) = j. We need to prove that p + i ≤ p + i . We consider two cases.
Case 1: j = j 0 . Since j = j 0 and µ + is equal to µ − ∪ {(i 0 , j 0 )}, we have µ − (j) = µ + (j) = i . Since (i, j) ∈ E( + ) = E( − ) ∪ {(i 0 , j 0 )} and j = j 0 , we have (i, j) ∈ E( − ). Since (i, j) ∈ E( − ), µ − (i ) = j, and The purpose of this section is to prove Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3. For any , any matching µ, and any men i, i ∈ I, we define an oriented µ-alternating path in G( ) from i to i as a µ-alternating path π in G( ) such that no edge in π ∩ µ is incident on i.
